I. The Past and the Future
Blaine Favel
and Ken S. Coates of the MacDonald-Laurier Institute, in Understanding UNDRIP
(United
Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), point out that “Successive Canadian governments
have made substantial financial, legal and political commitments to Indigenous peoples…Canadian
governments have [also] searched for the policy masterstroke to transform
Indigenous lives and provide a better quality of life for Indigenous peoples
for the last 150 years. Some of these have been disastrous.” www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/.../MLI-10-UNDRIPCoates-Favel05-16-WebReadyV4.pdf with the text of UNDRIP in Annex, May 2016
The authors identify
“the Indian Act, the reserve system, residential schools and efforts to erase
Indigenous cultures as those producing tragic consequences.”
Personally, I beg to
differ on some of these. But for the reserve system, sooner or later, the Indians
would have dispersed, become another racial and cultural minority group and in
the process, more likely than not, lose their identity and culture.
In so far as the
residential schools are concerned, contrary to some reliable evidence, the
project has been adjudged to have been a total inter-generational traumatising
failure.
Nevertheless, I suggest
that the original idea was certainly one worth pursuing, namely; to provide the
Indians with the opportunity to acquire an education that would have enabled
them to function in the new realities that confronted them; earn their
livelihood and become independent instead of
being treated as and remaining
wards of the State.
Then again, in those
days, I do not think the prime and proper society suspected that some of the
clergy who ran or taught these schools would turn out to be sexual perverts and
that both the clergy and the nuns would resort various forms of physical,
emotional and mental abuse or would tolerate student- on-student abuse which
accounts for 32 % of the cases where victims applied for compensation based on
this abuse.
I wonder whether with
the benefit of hindsight, the Indians whose present –day lives of never ending trials , tribulations and
poverty subjected to the racism,
prejudice, discrimination and exclusion
, wish that their forebears had acquired
such an education and lead productive
and independent lives free of racism, prejudice and exclusion.
And I truly believe
that aboriginal cultures, customs and practices, would have had a better chance
to survive and flourish; albeit with some adjustments to the changed
circumstances and environment.
The question
Given the abysmal track
record of governments in general, and of the Canadian government in particular
in social engineering, the reconciliation project raises the question as to
whether it will succeed or turn out to
be yet another masterstroke that will end up as yet another expensive tragedy?
II. The Government’s guiding authority of the reconciliation
process
In 2017, the Government
of Canada published a document titled “Principles respecting the Government of
Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples” (PGRIP).
1. The term “principle” defined
The term “principle” has a
number of meanings. In the present context, among a number of definitions, I
choose to describe it as the “fountain head” or “the foundation” (The Shorter Oxford
Dictionary 3rd ed. 1973) of the government’s reconciliation program.
This definition is adopted in
PGRIP which in the introductory statement to the document states:
“These principles are a
starting point to support efforts to end the denial of Indigenous rights that
led to the disempowerment and assimilationist policies and practices. They seek
to turn the page in an often troubled relationship by advancing fundamental
change whereby Indigenous peoples increasingly live in strong and healthy
communities with thriving cultures. To achieve this change,, it is recognized
that Indigenous nations are self-determining, self-governing, increasingly
self-sufficient, and rightfully aspire to no longer be marginalised, regulated
and administered under the Indian Act and
similar instruments….As part of this rebuilding, the diverse needs and experiences of Indigenous women and girls
must be considered as part of this work, to ensure a future where
non-discrimination, equality and justice are achieved. The rights of Indigenous peoples, wherever they live, shall be upheld.”
(Italics mine)
I am at a loss to understand,
the statement focuses on women and girls and omits the problems by men and boys.
Surely, these communities must
espouse, to borrow from PGRIP’s
phrasing quoted below, the rule of law, democracy, equality,
non-discrimination, and respect for human rights
Yet, the statement does not
address the critical issue of the empowerment of aboriginal persons, which I
consider to be a fundamental pre-requisite for the effective development and
functioning of self-governing aboriginal communities. I will return to this
issue.
Finally, I suggest that the government is unlikely to be able to live up to
its commitment to “uphold the rights of the aboriginal peoples, wherever they
live”, which rights, I presume, include the social rights enjoyed by all
Canadians, including the aboriginal ones, in devastated remote communities such
Pikangikum, regardless of the amounts of money invested in such communities,
short of relocating them to places that have access to the resources that are
needed to rehabilitate them.
2. The government’s definition of “reconciliation”
The narrative pertaining to
Principle 2, describes reconciliation as follows:
“Reconciliation is an ongoing
process through which Indigenous peoples and the Crown work cooperatively to
establish and maintain a mutually respectful framework for living together,
with a view to fostering strong, healthy and sustainable Indigenous nations
within a strong Canada.
…reconciliation requires
recognition of rights and that we [presumably the non-indigenous society], all
acknowledge the wrongs of the past, know our history, and work together to
implement Indigenous rights….Reconciliation [is] based on recognition.
...This transformative process
involves reconciling the pre-existence of Indigenous peoples and their rights
and the assertion of sovereignty of the Crown, including inherent rights, title
and jurisdiction.”
I believe that PGRIP read as a
whole, also suggests the following definition of the term that has been used in
Australia:
“…in its broadest sense “'reconciliation' [is] as 'coming together'. In
Australia, 'reconciliation'
refers to bringing together Aboriginal people the Torres Strait Islanders and
other Australians. ...Reconciliation has
elements of truth, justice, forgiveness, healing, reparation, and love.”
3. The meaning of reconciliation
for the Indian, Métis and Inuit peoples
To the best of my knowledge, to date, none of them and of the
organisations that speak on their behalf
a) commented in some detail on PGRIP;
b) published their definitions and understanding of the meaning of “reconciliation,
and more specifically, what they require in order to conclude it successfully.
Nor did they publish a statement of Principles that will guide their respective
approach to reconciliation.
4. The Principles
The document sets out
10 Principles each accompanied by a narrative.
The Principles are:
“The Government of Canada recognizes that:
1. All relations with
Indigenous peoples need to be based on the recognition and implementation of
their right to self-determination, including the inherent right of
self-government.
2. Reconciliation is a
fundamental purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
3. The honour of the Crown
guides the conduct of the Crown in all of its dealings with the Indigenous peoples.
4. Indigenous self-government
is part of Canada’s evolving system of cooperative federalism and distinct
orders of government.
5. Treaties, agreements, and
other constructive arrangements between Indigenous peoples and the Crown have
been and are intended to be acts of reconciliation based on mutual recognition
and respect.
6. Meaningful engagement with
Indigenous peoples aims to secure their free, prior and informed consent when
Canada proposes to take actions which impact them and their rights on their
lands, territories, and resources.
7. Respecting and implementing
rights is essential and that any infringement of section 35 rights must by law
meet a high threshold of justification which includes Indigenous perspectives
and satisfies the Crown’s fiduciary obligations.
8. Reconciliation and
self-government require a renewed fiscal relationship, developed in
collaboration with Indigenous nations, which promotes a mutually supportive
climate for economic partnership and resource development.
9. Reconciliation is an
ongoing process that occurs in the context of evolving Indigenous-Crown
relationships.
10. A distinctions-based
approach is needed to ensure that the unique rights, interests and
circumstances of the First Nations, the Métis Nation and Inuit are
acknowledged, affirmed, and
implemented.”
I cannot help but wonder
whether the number of principles was chosen to evoke the solemnity and
compelling powers of the 10 Commandments.
5. What are the 10 Principles about?
First, the Principles 2, 3 and
7 merely re-state the law of the land, which the government is already
duty-bound to abide by and therefore are redundant.
Second, Principles 8, 9 and 10
are self-evident propositions.
Third,
a) Principles 1 and 6 are
juridical statements that are ex-facie
problematic.
b) Principle 5 is a revisionist
interpretation of the meaning and objects of historical treaties and more
particularly the vast majority of the numbered treaties,
c) the narratives that
accompany each Principle remind me of the expression, “the devil is in the
details”.
Last, but not least, the PGRIP lacks a modicum of legal
prudence. It omits the
standard precautionary provisions 6.5 to 6.8 inclusive, of the Framework Agreement for Reconciliation dated January 28, 2017
executed by the Heiltsuk Nation and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.
These provisions edited in the
context of PGRIP, would read as follows:
1. The reconciliation process
and any action plans that flow from it will be consistent with the Constitution
of Canada and section 35 in particular.
2. PGRIP does not create,
affirm, deny or amend any legally enforceable rights.
3. The proceedings held and
the negotiations conducted in pursuit of the reconciliation process and all
related documents including PGRIP, are:
a) without prejudice to the
positions of the parties in any proceedings before the court or in any other
forum and shall not be construed as admissions of fact, law or liability, nor
trigger Principle 3, and
b) confidential, save for: the documents with respect to which the
parties agree otherwise in writing; interim and final agreements, Memoranda of
Understanding, other legal instruments, and those whose disclosure can be
obtained by law; all of which documents must be published forthwith on the
website of the Department(s) involved.
III. Negotiating
the Reconciliation
1. The federal government
In practical terms, the
reconciliation process is a process of negotiation and compromise a proposition
which is in line with PGRIP’s narrative.
Further, the fifth
paragraph of the introductory statement of PGRIP further states that
“This review of laws and policies will be guided by Principles
respecting the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous peoples…These
Principles are rooted in section 35, guided
by the UN Declaration, and informed by the Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC)’s Calls to Action…” In
addition, they reflect a commitment to good faith, the rule of law, democracy,
equality, non-discrimination, and respect for human rights. They will guide the
work required to fulfil the Government’s commitment to renewed
nation-to-nation, government-to-government, and Inuit-Crown relationships.” (Italics
mine)
Under Principle 2, this
undertaking is supplemented by the following narrative, which is not quite
consistent with the preceding one:
“The government of
Canada’s approach to reconciliation is guided by the UN Declaration, TRC’s Call
to Action, [unspecified] constitutional values, and in collaboration with
Indigenous peoples as well as provincial and territorial governments.”(Brackets
mine)
Quere:
And how about first foremost being guided by the judgments of the courts and
particularly those of the Supreme Court?
One of the peculiar
features of PGRIP is the absence of any mention of the critical role played by
the judiciary in the process of reconciliation, and deference to the judgments
of the Supreme Court.
2. The negotiation strategy of the aboriginal peoples
Favel and Coates point
out that: “It is clear... the funding currently available is not sufficient to
meet the myriad challenges facing the Aboriginal communities across the
country… It would help substantially; if Indigenous leaders would indicate
those areas of UNDRIP where they believe current Canadian practices are, in
terms of international minimum standards, at or above the expectations
articulated in the Declaration.”
Helpful it may be. Aboriginal
leaders unlike the government are too careful to make such any admission or
concessions at this point in time or, for that matter, I venture to say they
are unlikely to make them, at any time during the reconciliation process: they are
too astute to do this kind of thing. They are also very tenacious; they rarely give
up as illustrated by the case of the Mohawks of Akwesasne.
The case of the Mohawks of Akwesasne
Since, the early 1950s,
the Canadian Mohawks situated on the Akwesasne reserve near Cornwall, situated
on lands that straddle the boundaries of Quebec and Ontario as well as that of
Canada and United, claimed exemption from customs duties and taxes with respect
to the goods brought from the United States into Canada, pursuant to Article
III of the Jay Treaty of 1794. made by the British Crown and the United States.
In 1956, the Supreme
Court in Francis v. The Queen dismissed
the claim. But this did not, by any means, put the matter to an end.
In 1991, the band
succeeded in obtaining from the Minister of National Revenue, the Akwesasne Residents Remission Order
which provides that, with some exceptions, duties are not payable on goods
imported to Canada by a resident of the Canadian segment of the reserve for
personal use and for sale by the owner of a community store to the residents of
the Band, or for use by the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne in connection with
educational, hospital or social services.
That was still not
enough. Around 1995, Grand Chief Mitchell of Akwesasne tested
the law in Court again by claiming an exemption from duties and taxes for U.S. goods imported into Canada from the
United States for trading based on Mohawks’ aboriginal right to do so.
He succeeded in the Federal
Court both at the trial and on appeal. The claim was dismissed by the Supreme
Court for lack of evidence to meet the evidentiary test to establish the
existence of the alleged aboriginal right to do so. M.N.R v. Mitchell (2001)
Besides the Mitchell case, there have been prosecutions,
involving members of other aboriginal bands, including a member of the Hurons
of L’ Ancienne Lorette (Quebec), who relied not only the Jay Treaty but also on
the Treaty of Ghent 1814 as well as on a safe conduct issued in 1760 by a
British general to a group of these Hurons, which the Supreme Court judged to
be a treaty. R. v. Sioui (1990). All
to no avail.
In 2016, the matter of
border-crossing was the subject of a meeting of the Standing Senate Committee
on Aboriginal Peoples. The Committee focused on the free cross-border movement by
reasons of cross-border cultural and family ties on Akwesasne reserve as well
as in the case of other Indian bands located near the U.S border which also
share such ties.
In June 2016, the
Committee issued a report titled Border
Crossing Issues and the Jay Treaty.
Personally, I cannot
fathom why the Committee would still
dwell on the Jay Treaty because under
the international law of treaties ,Article III is not a “stipulation pour
autrui” (stipulation specifically made
for the benefit of one or more third parties, such as the Indians of Canada.
Based on the findings
and recommendations of the Committee, in December 2016, the Minister of
Indigenous Affairs appointed a special Ministerial Representative and mandated
him to engage with the Indian Bands in border communities and with aboriginal
organisation, to explore their views concerning Canada-U.S. border-crossing challenges
and potential solutions.
The Assembly of First
Nations (AFN) appointed former Grand Chief Mitchell to be its Special
Representative mandated to engage with the Canadian and American governments to
explore one possible solution to the problem.
Finally, at the
beginning of September 2017, it become known that the Canadian delegation to
the NAFTA negotiations, had put, among others, Indigenous rights on the list of
items to be negotiated
In response to the
criticism of this initiative, AFN’s National Chief, Perry Bellegarde opined
that
“Indigenous
rights should be a cornerstone of economic development in all three countries,
as recognised by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”
3. To sum–up
As matters now stand,
the process of reconciliation will proceed without a clear meeting of the minds
on an agreed upon specific sets of long-
term common goals and objectives with a common plan and strategies to reach
these goal.
In the meantime, it is
reasonable to expect that the aboriginal leaders will hold the present and the
following governments to the admissions, concessions and commitments made in PGRIP
and keep their feet to the fire to hold them to the word. So they should.
And I believe that it
will not be that long before the Indian peoples will be on solid ground to
accuse the government of breaches of promise, and of the honour of the Crown
for failing to live up to the Principles. So should they.
In this regard, a number of prominent Indian spokespersons have already
accused the Prime Minister of talking the talk but taking his sweet time to
start walking the walk to address long outstanding matters let alone to do
those things that are important to them, beyond providing fixing the problem of
polluted drinking water, so far, in about two dozen communities.
IV. Selected problems with the government’s approach
to reconciliation
First problem: The absence of a national plan of
action and strategies- “Haste makes waste”
The Prime Minister
committed himself to implement all of the recommendations of TRC.
One of these
recommendations read:
”…the federal government “develop a national action
plan, strategies, and other concrete, measures to achieve the goals of UNDRIP” [to
which I would add those in PGRIP]
Yet, the government
made the foregoing commitment without acting on it by
a)i) developing with respect to each of the
three aboriginal groups, say, a 10 year action plan; a transparent detailed national action
plan, strategies and other concrete measures (“plans”) of what it proposes
to do; how it proposes to do it and when
it proposes to do it ;
ii) sharing the plans with the representatives of
the appropriate aboriginal people on a national and/or regional basis,
depending on the circumstances;
b) asking each of the
three peoples’ representatives
i) to consult their
respective communal constituencies;
ii) to prepare their
respective transparent and detailed “plans” for the
corresponding period or a reasonably shorter one, say for 7 years;
iii) to state what they
minimally require and expect the federal and provincial governments involved in
the reconciliation process to accomplish in furtherance of their own plans over
the period, and what each of the aboriginal
peoples are prepared to do in furtherance of both sets of plans; and
iv) to submit their
plans and statements to the federal government upon receiving the approval of
their respective constituencies and share them with the appropriate provincial
and territorial governments;
c) asking the
provincial and territorial governments to prepare and submit their respective
plans and then follow the same process as that outlined with respect to the federal
government, and
d) i) reviewing the
three sets of plans with the appropriate aboriginal people and provincial and
territorial governments involved, and
ii) reconciling and integrating
each set of plans into an overall plan, to the extent it is possible to do so.
Second problem: Absence of actual and projected expenditure
number- transparency and public accountability
As pointed out by Favel
and Coates, in order to do that which the government promises to do for the aboriginal
peoples, it is important for the peoples and for the federal, provincial and
territorial governments, to have onside the non- aboriginal Canadians and the
taxpayers.
This is particularly so,
when, as is the case here, the federal, provincial and territorial governments lack
the financial heft to give effect to the implementation of the spirit of and of
all the concrete initiatives they will or may be called upon to
undertake and complete under the reconciliation process.
And in the case of the federal government, the
commitments include to give effect the provisions of PGRIP and UNDRIP; all of
the recommendations in TRC and some of the recommendations made by the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP).
At all events, the
governments owe the Canadians the duty of being forthcoming and providing
transparency both about the process and the public expenditures associated with
it.
In this regard, limiting myself to the federal government that has the lead role
in the reconciliation process; it must inform, Canadians, in ordinary plain
English, the maximum amount of monies, the government can and intends to spend, say, within the
first 10 years of the reconciliation
process,
a) specifically for the implementation PGRIP, UNDRIP, and the 94
recommendations of TRC, and
b) to finance the
existing and future programs and services that will be rendered to the aboriginal
peoples under and beyond the Indian Act by all government departments and their
respective emanations.
Further, the government
must also publish a handbook every two or three years which will provide
cumulative comparative tables and narratives, in plain English spoken by
Canadians, and in the most accessible manner to the general public, that
identifies
a) the specific
reconciliation related issues and problems
i) that have been resolved; and
ii) those currently being
addressed;
b) the costs associated
with each reconciliation related issue, problem and project, and
c) the issues and problems
with respect to which no or negligible progress has been made; the reasons therefor
and the costs incurred to date with respect to each.
Third problem: The Knowledge
Gap –“Ignorant zeal is foolish”
1. Indiscriminate use of legal concepts
The narrative on Principle
4, inter-alia, reads:
“Recognition of the inherent
jurisdiction and legal orders of
Indigenous Nations is therefore the starting point of discussions aimed at
interactions between federal, provincial, territorial ,and Indigenous jurisdictions and law. (Italics mine)
Quere: Precisely, what do the
phrases inherent
Indigenous jurisdictions and law and legal orders specifically refer to? What are the contents and
contours of the jurisdictions, law and legal
orders whose existence is being
admitted? Are these related to the treaties or part of the existing aboriginal
rights or those whose the existence the government has admitted or is prepared
to do so? Are these terms and phrases another way of referring to traditions, customs
and practices? If so, what exactly are these? If not, what are the factual
underpinnings of these legal concepts?
And further,
“As informed by the UN
Declaration [UNDRIP] Indigenous peoples
have a unique connection to and
constitutionally protected interest in their lands, including, decision making, governance, jurisdiction, legal traditions
and fiscal relations associated with those lands.” (Italics mine)
Quere: Precisely what
is the nature of this connection?
What are the facts that make the connection unique?
Are the lands in issue, reserve lands; traditional lands for hunting, fishing,
gathering and farming activities, or lands claimed to have unextinguished
title? What are the legal traditions in question? In the present context, what are the specific
meanings of the term law and the
phrases, legal order and legal traditions? Specifically, what kinds of decision- making and
governance are involved? What is
the jurisdiction, and more specifically,
what are the aboriginal legal traditions
and fiscal relations associated with the lands in question?
Finally, having regard
to the use of the word "including”,
specifically what else is
constitutionally protected? What are the factual underpinnings of these
concepts? Which of these is existing treaty or aboriginal rights?
I would have thought that,
the better part of discretion for the government would have been
First, not to refer to
or to concede specific rights which the Supreme Court has not addressed to date.
Second, not to refer to
legal concepts without providing the specific meanings attributed to each of them,
or for that matter, I very much suspect, without knowing the factual
underpinnings of these concepts from an aboriginal perspective.
Third, not to invoke
these concepts until their factual underpinnings from an aboriginal perspective
become a material issue that would need to be addressed in the course of the
reconciliation process, cases which would call for expert evidence in ethnology,
ethno-history and possibly history.
In the event the rights
or some of the rights in issue are aboriginal rights, prudence would have also
suggested that the text ought to have referred to the test which must be met in
order to prove the existence of an aboriginal right, formulated by the Supreme
Court in R. v Van der Peet (1996).
“The test
to establish an aboriginal right focuses on the integral, defining features of
the relevant aboriginal society before the Crown’s assertion of
sovereignty. A claimant must prove that a modern practice, custom
or tradition has a reasonable degree of continuity with a practice, tradition
or custom that was in existence prior to contact with the Europeans.
The practice, tradition or custom must have been integral to the distinctive
culture of the aboriginal people in the sense that it distinguished or
characterized their traditional culture and lay at the core of the aboriginal people’s
identity.”
Then again
judging from the narratives in PGRIP, the Attorney -General does not seem to care
very much, if at all, about juridical niceties, evidentiary imperatives or for
that matter about prudence and discretion in framing juridical propositions or
using legal concepts.
2. Five questions
The foregoing statements raise the following five critical questions:
First, does the government really thought about and know
a) the answers to the preceding sets of questions, and
b) the full implications of adopting these concepts, under section 35?
Second, does the government know the aboriginal perspectives and factual
underpinnings of this terminology?
Third, limiting myself to the second question, if the government
believes to have the requisite knowledge, where does this knowledge originate
from, and how reliable is it?
Fourth, has this knowledge been critically reviewed and assessed
independently, for the government?
I suggest that the last three questions need to be addressed sooner
rather later for the following practical reasons:
First, having conceded the material relevance of these concepts to the reconciliation process, it is
reasonable to expect that, in due course, one or more aboriginal groups and
more particularly, Indians will in due course come up with some expert reports
and will rely upon them in arguing their claims under the reconciliation
process or in court.
Second, based on my personal experience and observations in aboriginal
litigation, the chances are that these reports will be, not to put too fine a
point on it, most sympathetic to the case their clients seeking to make.
And, in the event of litigation, the trial judge may turn out to be “overly
generous” in his assessment and interpretation of the aboriginal plaintiffs’
expert evidence; endowed with.” a vague sense of after-the fact largesse”, or one
who simply “strains the evidence artificially to carry more weight than it can
reasonably support” (Mitchell, para.
39) as was, for example, the trial judge in the Mitchell case (para 39). His decision was upheld by the Federal
Court of Appeal.
In such circumstances, only a successful final appeal to the Supreme
Court, on the ground that the trial judge committed a “palpable and overriding
error” in his interpretation and assessment of the plaintiffs’ evidence, not
any easy task by any means, particularly in cases concerning aboriginal and
treaty rights, would straighten out the historical record.
The reasons for the experts’ sympathetic attitude towards aboriginal peoples
and approach to their claims save where the expert believes in the rightness of
the plaintiffs’ claims for ideological reasons are of practical nature.
Experts do not seem to be particularly good at cross-examining their aboriginal
informants to test the validity and reliability of the information they provide,
as evidenced in, if I remember correctly, in a couple of cases which I
litigated, where the informants or other members of the band, upon being called
to the witness stand, honest as they are, under cross- examination soon proceed
to contradict their experts’ report or otherwise make damning admissions.
If the aboriginal plaintiff’s expert comes up with a report that does
not fully support the aboriginal client’s claims or concedes in his report or
during his testimony the validity of some of the assertions made by the Crown or
set out in the expert reports on which the Crown relies, that expert,
particularly if he depends on field work to conduct his research, is in
trouble.
Those who depend on field work are unlikely to be permitted to enter
aboriginal communities again. In the absence of field work and the consequent
inability to publish papers on such work in the learned journals, the academic
career of the expert, most likely an ethnologist or ethno-historian or
archaeologist will be blocked.
And, if the expert happens to have a junior faculty position, it may
well go down the chute, unless the expert can re-direct his or her work to
matters that do not require fieldwork.
In the alternative, the expert who does not do field work for his
academic endeavours, will simply lose his aboriginal clientele.
Third, finding experts willing to work for the Crown side is easier said
than done, because an expert who works for the government’s case can never be
trusted by aboriginal parties. And again, the decision to work for the Crown might
well turn out to be something akin to professional suicide.
In my experience, I never encountered or heard about a case where
experts declined to work for the Crown on the grounds that the Crown’s case is
weak or devoid of merit. In my personal experience the refusal were based on
their wish not to be identified with a party adverse to the interests of aboriginal
parties that is when they bothered to return the call, reply to the letter.
Clearly, the foregoing statements are not absolute and I am sure there
are out there exceptions; exceptions which I fear confirm the validity of the
foregoing general propositions.
At all events, for the Crown, finding and retaining competent, unbiased
independent-minded experts, is close to looking for a needle in a haystack.
As it happened, I did manage to find and retain first rate expertise for
my cases.
If the reader is thinking that I am being utterly cynical and unfair, that
would be a rash and unwarranted conclusion because
a) I first heard about the foregoing fears and apprehensions from would
be experts;
b) when I joined the Department of Justice a prosecutor and subsequently
switched to litigation, the first principle of practice I was taught, and I
trust it is still being taught, is that winning or losing is not the important
thing. What is important is to be fair to and respectful of the plaintiffs or
defendants, and to identify, present and argue the issues raised by the case in
a competent manner.
Hence, my colleagues and I did not go to court to defend the Crown against
claims that are well-founded in fact and in law or to advance questionable
arguments.
That is not to say that our judgment was infallible. Errare humanum est.
It failed particularly in the litigation of aboriginal and treaty rights
under section 35, when the Supreme Court preceded full speed to make and keep
making new law; fully intent to give the word “recognised” the broadest
possible meaning concerning the nature, contents and interpretation of
aboriginal and treaty rights.
Thus, gone were the days when, among other things,
a) the Court would look at treaties as mere contracts where extrinsic evidence
is admissible only where the wording of the treaty is ambiguous;
b) an argument based doctrine of “extinguishment” was respectable, and
c) the aboriginal perspectives on the meaning and interpretation of
treaties were ignored.
After the enactment of
section 35, here are the days when the Supreme Court started to set and
keeps setting new rules that, for example;
a) give proper weight to extrinsic evidence concerning the aboriginal
perspectives and intentions in treaty- making;
i) in determining whether or not a document is a treaty;
ii) in the interpretation of treaties;
b) hold Indian treaties to be sui
generis in order to avoid a situation where aboriginal intentions,
understanding and interpretation of a treaty differ from the text of the treaty
as well as from the intentions, understanding and interpretation of the Treaty
Commissioners; a situation which would normally lead to the conclusion that the
parties had not been ad idem and
therefore the treaty is void ab initio;
c) resolve ambiguities through the blanket rule that where ambiguities
raise doubt as to the meaning of the written or spoken word(s) or the intention
of the party writing the text, the doubt must be resolved in favour of Indians.
Finally, it made and makes no difference to me personally whether the
Crown wins or loses an aboriginal case, so long as the case is handled competently
and the Court conducts a fair trial and issues a judgment supported by the
evidence and the law.
As a matter of fact, deep down, as a member of at least three
minorities, I hoped and still hope that the aboriginal plaintiffs would prevail
in those cases where a win would do much a great deal of good for the
aboriginal peoples, particularly when
the good would not cause unwarranted hardship
for others.
And, if any person or group of persons
in this country deserve to have their good days in Court, it certainly
got to be the aboriginal peoples that have been treated harshly and miserably for a
very long time and still are in many respects.
At all events, I submit, that at this stage of the reconciliation
process, it is critically important for the government to
a) search for identify and retain without delay, the services of the
kind of experts I described above;
b) not to even think of making them civil servants or to require them to
work away from their natural habitats, and
c) to make sure to benefit from
their advice throughout the reconciliation process.
3. What are the experts
up to these days in the matter of reconciliation?
The Federation of Humanities and Social Sciences, for whose members the reconciliation process
promises to be a lucrative endeavour, has announced its commitment to contribute to the
reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples.
Needless to say, the Federation will focus on the “crucial role” that
post –secondary education, the humanities and social sciences will play in the
process of research, understanding and action towards reconciliation. Cf. Http://www.Ideas-Idees.ca
The Federation also adopted the Touchstones
of Hope Principles and Processes to guide its work on reconciliation.
Cf. http://www.fncaringsociety.com/what-are-toucstones-hopes
One of these principles is:
”Respecting Aboriginal cultures and languages and acknowledging the
academy is heavily influenced by western cultures”
This principle raises a key question, namely; whether in the light of
this influence, the Federation takes the position that the large body of
ethnological, ethno-historical and historical knowledge concerning Canadian aboriginal
peoples published to date or parts thereof, need to be revisited and revised
for the successful conclusion of the phase of the reconciliation process which
according to the Federation is “truth telling”?
If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the government
ought to get on faster with the hiring of independent experts.
V. Outstanding matters that require urgent attention
The reconciliation
process cannot go far without addressing and resolving a number of issues, the
solutions to which are of critical importance for the orderly progress and
successful management of the process.
First matter: The absence of a coherent defined scheme
of aboriginal identities
1. Who are the Indians the contemplated by PGRIP?
Currently,
1. There are on-going
problems and controversies on the issue as to who is entitled to be registered
as a Status Indian under the Indian Act between the government and the Indians barred
from registration, as a result of the gender-based discriminatory provisions of
the legislation; and
2. The Senate and the
House of Commons are at odds with respect to the timing of the repeal of these
provisions.
3. The Supreme Court in
Daniels v. Canada (IAND) (2016) held,
surprise surprise, that non-Status Indians are Indians within section 91(24) of
the Constitution.
Based on this decision,
the non-Status Indians are bound to demand that they be given the same benefits
as Status Indians.
Should the government
refuse to do so; the former may be reasonably expected to litigate the issue
under the Charter.
As matters now stand,
we have at least nine categories of Indians with a number of overlaps. These
are:
1. The treaty Indians
(the lists of which Indians are not exactly free of problems)
2. Non-treaty Indians
3. Aboriginal Status-
Indians
4. Non-aboriginal
Status- Indians
5. Non-Status Indians
6. Persons who by
reason of being recognised as Indians under the current band membership rules
administered by Indian bands pursuant to the provisions of the Indian Act
7. Indians who are
members of Self- Governing Indian bands but who still have Indian status.
8. Indians who are
members of bands under the Indian Act, and
9. Indians who are not
members of any band.
Further, the Prime
Minister has spoken of repealing the “colonial" Indian Act without giving
any indication as to when and how this will be done, or providing any
information about the nature of the legislative scheme(s) that will succeed it.
The fact of the matter
is that, realistically, the government cannot repeal the Act, without consulting
the groups or the proper combination of the groups of Indians identified above
and some others identified below, with a view to reach an overall satisfactory agreement
within a fixed deadline that would be reflected in the successor legislation.
Failing such agreement,
the government must get on to frame unilaterally the provisions of one or more successor
pieces of legislation in order to establish a coherent scheme of Indian identity
and an equitable treatment of all the Indians under the reconciliation process.
And at some point in time,
the government must also review PGRIP to determine whether some of the Principles
and objectives of the reconciliation process will have to be amended.
Therefore, it is high
time to address, negotiate and, at all events, resolve, the complex and
potentially explosive issue of Indian identity within a legislative framework
and in the context of the reconciliation process.
As with non-Status
Indians, the Supreme Court in the Daniels
case, held that the Métis are also Indians within section 91(24).
Having regard to the
fact that the section 35(2) recognizes the Métis as one of the three aboriginal peoples of Canada,
I wonder what on earth led the government to contest the matter.
In this instance, the
issue is: Who is entitled to be recognised as Métis for the purposes of section 91(24) and of the
reconciliation process?
According to the last
National Household survey, such as it was, 428,380 Canadians self-identified as
Métis.
“ ‘Métis’ means a person who self-identifies as Métis, is distinct from other Aboriginal peoples, is of
historic Métis Nation ancestry and who is accepted by the Métis Nation.”
I suggest that it is
not unreasonable to anticipate that as the
government begins to provide the Métis people collectively with financial aid of various kinds, some of which
may trickle down to the individual level, and in the event the government were
to decide to grant financial and other
benefits directly to members of
particular sub-groups of the collective, the number of persons who will self-identify as Métis and seek to register themselves with the MNC in order to become “citizens of the Métis Nation”, is bound to increase.
In this
connection, the question as to whether
the government is prepared to adopt MNC’s definition of Métis as well as the list of those registered by the MNC
remains to be seen.
In the light of the
government’s decision to deal with the Métis people on a government-to -government basis, it
will find it extremely difficult to justify going behind the list of the
registered people and, most unlikely, to draw and administer its
own list.
3. Who is an Inuit?
I am not familiar with
the situation of the Inuit .To the extent, the membership in the community
raises identity issues, needless to say, these must be also be resolved.
To sum up
In terms of priorities,
surely the resolution of the definitions of the identity of aboriginal persons
is critically important to the proper articulation of a number of schemes and promises
set out in PGRIP; the implementation of UNDRIP; and of the recommendations of
TRC, and in making use of some of the recommendations of RCAP.
The failure to find and
implement the definitive solution(s) to the foregoing identity problems on a
timely basis will cause, sooner or later, but inevitably, otherwise avoidable
a) complications -if
not some chaos- in the reconciliation process, and
b) waste of scarce
financial resources.
Second matter: The empowerment of aboriginal persons-The
case of the members of the Indian peoples and bands
1. The problem
In July 2105, prior to
the general elections the Prime Minister speaking at a meeting of the Assembly
of First Nations (AFN) emphasised his government’s intention to engage with the
Aboriginal communities on a nation-to- nation basis.
Since then he repeated
a number of times that the government is committed to conduct the reconciliation
nation-to-nation or government-to- government and Crown and Inuit.
This promise is now
embodied in the narrative under Principle 6 of PGRIP.
At this point, I should
say that I am at a loss to understand why the government is dealing with the
Indian peoples on a nation- to -nation and the Métis people on a
government- to- government basis, a useless distinction at all events, while
the relations of the government with the Inuit people are defined as one
between the Crown and the Inuit, a formalistic affectation of some sort that in
practical terms does not make much, if any, sense.
This commitment raises
the critical question: But, what about the individual rights and privileges of the
members of the Indian peoples both as aborigines and citizens of Canada and
their right to exercise them freely?
As I stated above, I
firmly believe that the personal empowerment of Indians is one of the
fundamental pre-conditions to make sound progress in the reconciliation between
the government and the Indian peoples, if nothing else, in matters of of
self-determination and self-government.
This empowerment will
come about by
a) dealing effectively
with the problems of
i) physical and mental
health;
ii) various types of
dependencies and substance abuse;
iii) community and
family violence and child abuse;
iv) inadequate basic community infra-structure;
b) providing
i) the young with a
sound education, healthy curricular and extra-curricular recreational
activities and instilling in them the ambition to make good in their chosen
avocations as well as in their personal lives, and
ii) the adults who are
too old to go back for formal schooling, with adult education; vocational or on-
the- job training and needless to say, steady employment “real” job.
Last but not least, empowerment will come about by insuring that
the reconciliation process does not crush the individuals’ capacity for
and actual empowerment under the yokes of corporatism and aboriginal
collectivism that has been exacerbated by 150 years under Indian Act.
The narrative on
Principle 2 demands that we know our “true history”. Surely this history
includes that of the aboriginal peoples of Canada and in the present context presents
an appropriate opportunity to address briefly the claim that aboriginal
traditions, beliefs, customs and practices are predicated on collective
decision- making and action.
Aboriginal leaders keep
asserting and emphasising the collective nature of their rights and freedoms and
the virtues of the present methods of collective decision-making and their
primacy over individual rights and freedoms.
In the result, the
individual members of the Indian peoples are not allowed or unable to exercise
the rights to challenge the existence, validity or applicability of old traditions,
beliefs, customs and practices invoked in decision- making in matters decided
outside the confines of the decisions made by the Chief and Council of Indian bands
under the Indian Act and to a limited extent in the latter case.
In the result, the rank and file members of
the Indian peoples are deprived of the right to participate fully and
effectively in the decision- making process in all matters that touch upon
their lives and the life of the collective to which they belong.
To prove or illustrate
their case, in many instances, the aboriginal leaders point to the way Indian
peoples made treaties.
2. The case of treaty-making
Although I know it to
be contrary to the pronouncements of the Supreme C that has to insure
consistency in its reasoning concerning the manner in which treaties must be
understood and interpreted, I submit that
a compelling case can be made and in fact was made in a case decided in
the Federal Court, Trial Division, as it was then, back sometime during the
last three decades of the preceding century, for the proposition that on a fair
reading of the numbered treaties,
a) these were signed on
behalf of Indians in their personal capacity and not as collectives under their
Chiefs;
b)while some of the
provisions of the treaties provide for the collective decision- making as for
example, in surrendering reserve lands; most of the treaty rights such as the
rights to hunt, fish or engage in other avocations are certainly personal
rights;
c) almost all the
rights, obligations and duties prescribed in the treaties are of a personal
nature, and
d) to the extent, in
some instances, the treaties hold the Chiefs responsible for the conduct of the
members of the band; this was nothing more than the government’s western way of
handling accountability.
Indeed, there is
reliable evidence that historically the Indians of the west and north western
Indians were individualists. Prior to treaty making, they enjoyed the personal freedom
to move from band to band, and par for the course was the implosion or
splintering of bands whose Chiefs proved to be unsatisfactory to some or all of
their followers, and, the phenomenon of Chiefs without a band.
Indeed, some Indians
and the Métis “leading an Indian life style” who had the premonition of the
regimentation that would follow the execution of the numbered treaties, did not
care for them, and either stayed out of the treaty process altogether, and some
of those who stayed, quit their bands after having had a taste of the
management of bands after the new Indian Act was implemented.
3. The representativeness of the current Indian aboriginal
organisations
On June 12, 2017, the
Prime Minister and the National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations and
other aboriginal leaders executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on shared
priorities in the context of the permanent bilateral mechanism process
announced by the Prime Minister in December 2016.
In the present context,
the press release issued by the government on this occasion has two noteworthy passages:
The first reads:
“THE MOU will help guide the Government of
Canada and the Assembly of First Nations as the parties discuss options to
advance shared priorities, assess progress towards goals for First Nations, and
facilitate the ongoing work of building a true nation to nation relationship
between Canada and First Nations.”
“Today’s event is a milestone for both the
Government of Canada and the Assembly of First Nations. In the weeks and months
to come, key Cabinet Ministers will have the opportunity to discuss with First
Nations leaders how Canada and AFN can work together to advance shared
priorities, co-develop policy and promote lasting and meaningful reconciliation
for the benefit of First Nations members and all Canadians.” as the parties
discuss options to advance shared priorities, co-develop policy and promote lasting and meaningful
reconciliation for the benefit of First Nations members and all Canadians.”
The problem with the
first statement is that the AFN is not a nation and does not represent a
particular nation, and the assertion of dealing nation to nation, is just glib
flattering talk.
Further, the National Chief
and the members of the executive committee of the AFN are not elected by the
members of the Indian peoples on or off reserve.
The Chief of AFN is
selected by the Chiefs of the Indian bands. And, the organisation has been
making slow haste in examining three alternative election processes, one of
which is based on universal suffrage.
Yet, the second
statement provides that some other Indian leaders, will also advise as to how
the government and the AFN can work together to advance “shared priorities”
without giving any indication who and how these other leaders will be
identified.
One cannot make the process
of decision-making much more remote than it is now.
Yet again, these
statements bring me back to the question: Where are the individual members in
all of this?
Power is hard to
relinquish and oligarchies are hard to dismantle.
Empowerment in the context of the reconciliation
process
I submit that all the
leaders of the three aboriginal peoples and of aboriginal organisations
involved in the reconciliation process must be required to be elected
democratically by universal suffrage and made accountable to their respective
constituencies of aboriginal members in the manner set out above.
I further submit that the federal, provincial
and territorial governments, in their dealings with aboriginal peoples in the
context of reconciliation or otherwise, must make it their duty and obligation
to insure that Indians enjoy the right
to universal suffrage and exercise it
a) in the election of
the leaders and executives of all the aboriginal organisations that purport to speak,
represent, negotiate and agree on their behalf, and
b) to approve, modify
or reject the initiatives, proposals, MOUs, draft and final agreements framed
by the governments and aboriginal “leaders” that purport to represent their
interests.
After all, members of the
Indian peoples and bands have a personal interest and stake in the proper
definition, interpretation and application of all the freedoms and rights
envisaged in sections 25 and 35, in the context of traditional aboriginal
“laws”, beliefs, customs and practices, as well as, in negotiations within and
without the context of reconciliation and in their outcomes.
Finally, personal empowerment cannot be achieved without providing those wish to bring forth
their cases but lack the financial means and the necessary resources.
They need be provided
with these by the Department of Indigenous Affairs’ test case funding program;
provincial legal- aid services, with the support of law societies’ in securing
experienced counsel knowledgeable in aboriginal issues to take on the cases pro-bono.
I consider the failure
to insert personal empowerment of aboriginal persons as one of the Principles
in PGRIP to be one of the fundamental shortcomings of the document. Then again,
the insertion of this subject would have been a politically incorrect move.
Needless to say, the foregoing proposals will be met with angry protests and accusations of acting as “colonials”
in interfering with the aboriginal peoples’ right to self-determination
including their inherent right to
self-government recognised in PGRIP and a breach of the provisions of UNDRIP,
and of course, bad faith.
Interestingly enough,
in so far as the provisions of UNDRIP are concerned the position I advance is
consistent with Article 46.3 of UNDRIP that reads:
“Article 46
1…..
2…..
3. The provisions set
forth in this Declaration shall be
interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, and
respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and
good faith.”(Italics mine)
Be that as it may, the
fact remains that aboriginal persons are citizens of Canada and as such they
must enjoy the same rights and freedoms as the rest of the Canadians. And to
the extent, section 25 stands in their way to challenge traditional aboriginal
“laws”, beliefs, customs and practices in decision making, section 25 will need
to be amended.
And, unless Quebec
takes this opportunity to bring other constitutional “problems, to the table, I
am confident that Canadians would urge their respective provincial governments
and the federal one to vote for the amendment, after consulting the aboriginal
peoples.
And that consultation
will inevitably open a can of worms in the light of Principle 1 and the
narratives related to it. A subject to which I will return.
Fourth issue: The representation and participation of
urban Indians; Indians who are not band members; non-treaty and non-Status
Indians, in the reconciliation process and in the affairs of their respective
ethnic people
These groups are
understandably and quite legitimately concerned with and apprehensive about the
reconciliation process envisaged by PGRI guided by UNDRIP, and informed by TRC
in terms of its implications, and potential negative impacts on them.
These concerns and
apprehensions are heightened by the government’s undertaking to deal with
aboriginal peoples on a nation- to- nation or government –to- government basis
and the fact that their participation,
the nature and scope of it has yet to be addressed and determined.
In fairness to this
segment of the aboriginal peoples, this issue must to be addressed without
further delay.
VI. The Problematic Principles: 1, 2, 4 and 5
Principles 1: Self-determination and self-government
1.Imprudent affirmations and admissions
Principle 1 reads:
“The Government of
Canada recognizes that all the relations with Indigenous peoples need to be
based on the recognition and implementation of their right to self-determination, including the inherent right of self
–government.” (Italics mine).
The narrative under Principle 4 that addresses
the aboriginal self-government in the context of federalism and distinct orders
of government states:
“This principle affirms the inherent right of self -government as an
existing Aboriginal right within section 35.”
The very last sentence of the narrative under Principle 5 concerning the
treaties, informs us that
“The Government of Canada recognizes Indigenous peoples’ right to
self-determination, including the
right to freely pursue their
economic, political, social, and
cultural development. (Italics mine)
By way of preliminary
observation, it strikes me as strange for the government to introduce the
concept of self-determination and insert into it the inherent right of
self-government since the former concept has not been ordinarily part of the
juridical and judicial discourse of self-government.
These statements read
together are confusing and again beg for answers to the following questions:
In the context of the
foregoing narrative, is there a material difference between the right to
self-determination and the right to self- government? If so, what is it?
Can a right that is not
inherent include a right that is? If the inherent right to self-
government is an existing aboriginal
right within section 35, why should that not also be the case for the right to self- determination;
particularly since the latter right includes the right of the aboriginal peoples
to pursue “freely” their “political” development”?
Having regard to the
word “including” in the statement of the Principle, what other specific rights
does the right to self-determination include?
What are the precise scope,
contents, and contours of each of the rights identified so far by Principle 1
and of the other rights included in self-determination?
The basic question
raised by this principle is: Why is the government admitting the of existence
of all these rights, and in particular explicitly conceding the existence of a
broad right to self –government under section the alleged right to self-
government is an existing aboriginal right under section 35 and if s flesh out the
contents and contours of this right.
As a matter of fact, the
Supreme Court has been very cautious in approaching this issue. As William B.
Henderson points out in his paper Self
–Government: Indigenous peoples, the Court has taken “an incremental approach to the right of aboriginal
self-government and broadening law-making powers and jurisdiction through the
exercise of the right.”(Edited in the arrangement of the text) “… in
Pamajewon (1996) while the Court was
prepared to consider the possibility that a right of self-government was
recognised by section 35(1), it stopped short of ruling accordingly; in Delgamuukw (1997) the Court declined to deal with the issue,
while in Sparrow (2000) it
sidestepped it.”
And I believe that it is quite unlikely that the Court will address the issue until it is seized of a case which it
considers to be appropriate for this purpose; probably, a case where the existence of the alleged aboriginal right
of self- government under section 35, is
the sole issue raised by the appeal.
Even then, based on the
decisions rendered by the Court to date, decidedly, it will not approach claims
of aboriginal right of self-government based on broad allegations of the nature
or scope of the right but instead will focus on the factually most accurate
characterisation of the specific conduct, action or activity alleged to be a
feature of the alleged self- government.
.
For example, in Pamawejon the appellants sought immunity
from prosecution pursuant to the gambling provisions of the Criminal Code by defining
the right to self-government in issue as “the existence in their bands of a
broad authority to make decisions regarding natives’ social economic and
cultural well-being.”
Eight of the nine
judges cut through the verbiage and proceeded to frame “the most accurate
characterisation of the appellants’ claim, namely; that section 35(1) recognizes and affirms the
rights of [their respective bands’] to
participate in ,and to regulate, gambling activities on their respective reserve lands.”
The Court held that
“Assuming without
deciding that s. 35(1) includes self-government claims, the applicable legal
standard is that laid out in R. Van der
Peet. [1996 para. 180]. Claims to self-government made under s 35(1) are no
different from other claims to the enjoyment of aboriginal rights and must be
measured against the same standard.”
The ninth judge dismissed
the case on the ground that the appellants’ claim to aboriginal right of
self-government is “overly broad”.
The Court further
adopted the position of Osborne J.A. in Pamawejon that Sparrow, is authority for the proposition that
“… any broad inherent
right to self- government held by the appellants was extinguished by the British
assertion of sovereignty.”
And I would further
argue, that even if British sovereignty had not, it was certainly extinguished by
most of the numbered treaties; in the alternative, by the Indian Act or by the
combination of the provisions of the numbered treaties and of the Indian Act
read together, to the extent that until the enactment of Bill C-31 in 1985,
Indian bands could not even determine their own membership.
And unlike, the
fisheries regulations in the Sparrow case which the Supreme Court held not to
have extinguished but merely regulated the right to fish for
food, the Indian Act can hardly be said to have merely regulated the right to self-government.
Ultimately, all
suggestions and proposals, including the recommendations of RCAP, and the
initiative in the Meech Lake Accord to make
a special provision for the recognition and affirmation of the existence aboriginal
right of self- government came to naught.
In the premises, so
far, the broad right of self-government in Principle 1 is not an aboriginal
right but, in effect, one granted by the government.
In the meantime, the
form, jurisdiction, authority and powers of aboriginal self- government and its
status in the constitutional pecking order of governments remains to be
determined. In this regard, Principle 4 states:
“The Government of Canada recognizes that
Indigenous self-government is part of Canada’s evolving system of co-operative federalism
and distinct orders of government.”
The notion of “evolving
co-operative federalism” is a political feel good notion, whose existence at
any particular point in time, as we all know, is subject to the whims, moods
and ideologies of the political parties that happen to govern Canada and the
provinces, especially when constitutional and fiscal issues are at stake. At
all events, at this point in time, co-operative federalism is immaterial to the
matter under consideration.
To my mind, Principle 4
is a sort of fishing expedition designed to ascertain and assess the views of
the provinces, territorial governments and the aboriginal leaders on this
subject.
At all events, until
the aboriginal communities become economically self-sufficient to run their own
governments, the notion of self-government is unlikely to be received well by
the non-aboriginal taxpayers or, for that matter, the aboriginal groups and
individuals who may be precluded from enjoying the benefits, such as they might
be, generated by the establishment of these governments.
2. Interim alternative paths to self-governance
In the meantime,
nothing prevents the government and the Indian bands together with the
appropriate provincial governments to reach agreements to establish aboriginal municipalities
located on their respective reserves.
By way of illustration,
a somewhat similar approach was adopted by the government of Alberta through
the Alberta’s Métis Settlements Act of 2000 which, among other things, provides for Métis self-governance under the laws of Alberta, in
settlements established on lands given to Métis communities by the province. Cf. Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development) v. Cunningham (S.C.C. 2011)
And in the event the Indian
bands do not care for the Alberta scheme, they can opt to become “Self-Governing
Bands” (SGBs), the main features of which are:
1. The Indian Act no
longer applies to the SGB or to its “citizens”, although individual “citizens” may
still be entitled to “status” under the Indian Act.
2. The SGB
a) owns and manages its
land base.
b) sets its own
priorities, and its election process is defined by its Constitution.
c) has the power to tax
its citizens and other residents.
It strikes me as
strange that Indian bands have not opted in greater numbers to become SGBs for
starters to get some experience in
self-government in the light of the fact
that Indian leaders have long asserted
and demanded the recognition of the aboriginal
right to self- government.
Finally, Principle 1 also
raises the questions as to where and how the non-treaty and non-Status Indians;
Indians who are not members of a band and urban aboriginal peoples who are
members of various bands will fit into the self-determination and
self-government schemes.
To sum up, I submit
that, in Principle 1, the government has thrown caution to the winds and
unwisely got ahead of itself by adopting the broad definition of and approach
to self-government.
Having affirmed the
proposition of law set out in the Principle, the government will have a hard
time to circumvent it, particularly in the light of Principle 3 which reads:
“The honour of the Crown guides the conduct of the Crown in all of its
dealings with the Indigenous peoples.”
I would not be
surprised, if at some point, the aboriginal
leaders, armed with Principles 1 and 5 invoke their peoples’ right to
self-determination and self-government, and demand an altogether different type
of relationship with the provinces and with the federal government.
At all events, the
government having thumped its nose to the Supreme Court by admitting the
existence of the broad rights in question, in the event the issue is litigated
at the instance of the aboriginal peoples, the federal government will have a
hard time to renege on its position, and in fact, may have no choice but to
stand by it.
Frankly, I dread the
day when the Attorney-General of Canada will put the Supreme Court in that delicate situation of having to dismiss a broadly claim for aboriginal right to
self-government , while at the same ignoring ,in effect dismissing, the submissions of the federal government in
line with Principle 1 and the narrative related to it.
Principle 2- What is section 35 about?
The Principle reads
The Government of
Canada recognizes that reconciliation is a fundamental purpose of section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982
Personally, I would
have phrased the Principle as follows:
The Government of
Canada recognizes that reconciliation through the recognition, affirmation and
respect of the existing aboriginal, treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples is
the rationale underlying the enactment of Section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982; while the protection these and other rights and freedoms the aboriginal
peoples may have is the rational for enacting section 25 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms
Beyond the statement of
the Principle, PGRIP’s narrative concerning section 35 verges on the peculiar.
The second sentence of
the first paragraph of the introductory statement to the Principles reads.
Section 35 contains a full box of rights and holds the promise
that Indigenous nations will become partners in Confederation on the basis of a
fair and just reconciliation between
the Indigenous peoples and the Crown. (Italics mine)
First, can reconciliation
be effected on any basis other than one which the aboriginal peoples consider
to be “fair and just”?
Second, in light of the
foregoing considerations concerning Principle 1, how could section 35 hold the alleged
promise?
Third, what exactly does it mean that section
35 contains “a full box of rights”?
Is the box that is a full sized one that contains rights or is it simply a box
full of rights? If the box is full of rights, does that mean that henceforth these
will be the only rights protected by section 35?
Surely, the box cannot
be full, since, among others, the Court has yet to pronounce itself on the
existence of all the rights recognised by the government in Principle 1?
Fourth, does section 35
hold the alleged promise? Hardly. Surely, most of the rights, privileges and
freedoms enjoyed by the aboriginal peoples at present are not section 35 rights
and, if sober minds prevail, these are not likely to become such rights, as a
result of the reconciliation process; nor do they need to be.
The fifth paragraph of
the introductory statement continues:
“The] review of laws
and policies will be guided by Principles respecting the Government of Canada’s
Relationship with Indigenous peoples.
These Principles are rooted in section 35, guided by the UN Declaration, and
informed by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples(RCAP) and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC)’s Calls to Action“.(Italics
mine)
By way of preliminary
observation, and as I already demonstrated above, all the Principles, and some
segments of narratives that purportedly explain or actually expand the scope of
some Principles, are not rooted in section 35.
Furthermore, the
statement does not quite accord with the narrative under Principle 2:
“The Government of Canada’s approach to reconciliation is guided by the
UN Declaration, the TRCs Calls to Action, constitutional
values, and collaboration with Indigenous peoples as well as provincial and
territorial governments.”(Italics mine)
Quere: What exactly are these constitutional values? Surely the approach
to reconciliation ipso facto includes
the review of laws and policies. Hence, how each be guided separately by two different
instruments?
If the Principles are
rooted in section 35, then, these cannot be guided by the UNDRIP since the
Declaration is not part of Canadian domestic law; nor do all its provisions fit
within the scope of the section and consequently are not in line with the section
35 rights recognised and affirmed by the Supreme Court to date.
In so far as the
narratives concerning section 35 are concerned, I also note the following
statement under Principle 5:
“In accordance with
section 35, all Indigenous peoples in Canada should have the choice and
opportunity to enter into treaties, agreements, and other constructive
arrangements with the Crown as acts of reconciliation that form the foundation
for ongoing relations.”
Surely, section 35 is wholly immaterial. As a matter of fact,
historically, the Indians and the Métis (I am
not sufficiently familiar with the case of the Inuit) had the choice and the
opportunity to initiate or not to initiate, to accept or not to accept trading
agreements with the Hudson’s Bay Company as early as 1681-82.
More broadly, the aboriginal peoples of Canada have enjoyed the choice to
initiate or not to initiate requests for treaty- making, as well as the
opportunity and the choice to accept or to refuse the treaties offered to them
by the Crown as far back as 1725, and, prior to the enactment of section 35, as
late as 1975, with the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.
Principle 5: What were the treaties about in the historical context? The
case of the numbered treaties.
Principle 5
states:
“The Government of
Canada recognizes that treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements
between Indigenous peoples and the Crown have been and are intended to be acts
of reconciliation based on mutual recognition and respect.”
Quere: What is a
“constructive arrangement”? Specifically, to which arrangement(s) does the text
refer to?
The narrative adds:
“In accordance with the Royal Proclamation of
1763, many Indigenous nations and the Crown historically relied on treaties for
mutual recognition and respect to frame their relationships. Across much of
Canada, the treaty relationship between the Indigenous nations and Crown is a
foundation for ongoing cooperation and partnership with Indigenous peoples.”
I readily concede that
modern treaties, agreements and comprehensive land claim settlements are indeed
intended to be acts of reconciliation based on mutual recognition and respect
and that these legal instruments provide one of the foundations of the current
relationship between the parties to these legal arrangements and possibly, with
the Canadians living in the regions where they are in effect.
However, in a
historical context, I consider the proposition that”treaty –relationship
between the Indigenous nations and the Crown was “a foundation for ongoing
co-operation and partnership with Indigenous peoples” to be fine words.
Surely, of the
relationship had been of that nature of the relationship, Indian peoples would
not have been put upon as badly as they have been and in some ways still are.
This brings me to the question
raised by the wording of the Principle as to whether the numbered treaties were
based on mutual recognition and respect.
The leaders of the
Indian peoples and their national organisations speak in glowing terms of the
spirit and intent of the historical treaties.
At the 2010 annual
General Meeting of the AFN, the assembly passed a resolution titled “Sacred
Treaties-Sacred Trust: Working Together for Treaty Implementation and Advancing
our Sovereignty as Nations”
These leaders
passionately and repeatedly insist that their treaty rights are sacred must be
respected at all times, a claim that appears to have been substantiated in
connection with some of earlier numbered of treaties.
1. Treaty-making
From the Crown’s perspective, the Royal Proclamation,
which the Supreme Court has characterised as a “quasi-Constitutional document”,
provides the rationale for treaty- making and the reasons and purposes for which the territories in issue were
to be reserved to the Indians. The relevant passages of the Proclamation read:
“And whereas it is just and
reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security of our Colonies,
that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and
who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the
Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded
to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them. or any of them, as their Hunting
Grounds.--We do therefore, with the Advice of our Privy Council, declare it to
be our Royal Will and Pleasure. that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any
of our Colonies of Quebec, East Florida. or West Florida, do presume, upon any
Pretence whatever, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass any Patents for Lands
beyond the Bounds of their respective Governments. …
We do further
declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure, for the present as aforesaid, to
reserve under our Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion, for the use of the
said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not included within the Limits of
Our said Three new Governments, or within the Limits of the Territory granted
to the Hudson's Bay Company, as also all the Lands and Territories lying to the
Westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea from the West and
North West as aforesaid.
And We do hereby strictly forbid, on Pain of our Displeasure, all our
loving Subjects from making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking
Possession of any of the Lands above reserved without our especial leave and
Licence for that Purpose first obtained.
And. We do further strictly enjoin and require all Persons whatever who
have either wilfully or inadvertently seated themselves upon any Lands within
the Countries above described. or upon any other Lands which, not having been
ceded to or purchased by Us, are still reserved to the said Indians as
aforesaid, forthwith to remove themselves from such Settlements.
And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been
committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our
Interests. and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians: In order,
therefore, to prevent such Irregularities for the future, and to the end that
the Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove
all reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do. with the Advice of our Privy Council strictly enjoin and require.
that no private Person do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of
any Lands reserved to the said Indians, within those parts of our Colonies
where, We have thought proper to allow Settlement: but that. if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined to
dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our
Name, at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for
that Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony respectively
within which they shall lie: and in case they shall and in case they shall lie within the Limits of any Proprietary
Government, they shall be purchased only for the Use and in the Name of such Proprietaries,
conformable to such Directions and Instructions as We or they shall think
proper to give for that Purpose: And We do, by the Advice
of Our Privy Council, declare and enjoin, that the Trade with the said Indians
shall be free and open to all our Subjects whatever; provided that every
Person, who may incline to trade with the said Indians, do take out a Licence
for carrying on such Trade from the Governor or Commander in Chief of any of
Our Colonies respectively, where such Person shall reside; and also give Security to observe such Regulations as We
shall at any Time think fit, by Ourselves or by Our Commissaries to be
appointed for this Purpose, to direct and appoint for the Benefit of the said
Trade; And We do hereby authorize, enjoin, and require the Governors and
Commanders in Chief of all Our Colonies respectively, as well Those under Our
immediate Government as those under the Government and Direction of
Proprietaries, to grant such Licences without Fee or Reward, taking especial
Care to insert therein a Condition, that such Licence shall be void, and the
Security forfeited, in Case the Person, to whom the same is granted, shall
refuse or neglect to observe such Regulations as We shall think proper to
prescribe as aforesaid.”(Italics mine) Text derived from Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations Relating to
America, 1603-1783 https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/010319729
Accordingly, if the
officials making treaties were mindful of anything, they were mindful of
first, the need to convince the Indians of the territories identified in the Proclamation, of the Crown’s sense of justice in its dealings with
or about their lands and its determination to remove all reasonable cause of discontent
in their treatment;
second, getting the
Indians peacefully settled away on terms that the Crown considered to be “just
and reasonable”, and
third, insuring that
the Indians remained peaceful in their dealings with the newcomers, and as
importantly, amongst themselves.
On the latter point,
historically Indian peoples did not shy away from engaging in tribal wars with
one another and with other peoples. For example, the Mohawks of Mohawk Valley,
are said to have decimated or suspected of decimating the St. Lawrence Iroquois
(a group distinct than the Iroquois of the Iroquois Confederacy); the Iroquois’
conquest of Huronia and the enslavement of Hurons, which by then had become
Catholics, caused the end of Huronia, and in the north-western region, the Indians
and the Inuit were mortal foes and. engaged in fierce hostilities.
2. Treaty making nation–to-nation
With respect to the
treaties signed after the enactment of the Indian Act of 1876 (An Act to amend
and consolidate the laws respecting Indians), the Treaty Commissioners had no
reason to think outside the box i.e. the
Indian Act, and every reason to act in accordance with its premises .
As a matter of fact, the
Treaty Commissioners addressed the Indians with expressions such as the
Queen’s- “the Great White Mother‘s children”.
Consequently, there was
no reason for them to consider the Indians with whom they treated to constitute
“Nations” even where the treaties used the term, as a result of having in mind the
wording of the Royal Proclamation even
in territories not covered the
Proclamation.
3. Were the
treaties acts of reconciliation?
The term ”
reconciliation” in the context of treaty-making is not synonymous with the
meaning of the term in the context of the reconciliation process contemplated
in PGRIP, and defined in the narratives of the introductory statement and under
Principle 2 quoted above.
Rather, as also stated
under Principle 2 the reconciliation in question involved
“…reconciling the
pre-existence of Indigenous peoples and their
rights and the assertion of the sovereignty of the Crown... including [their] inherent rights, title and
jurisdiction.” [at common law,
having regard to the terms of the treaties and the laws of the Realm
incorporated by reference into the treaties.] (Brackets mine)
4. Were the treaties based on mutual recognition?
In so far as the notion
of mutual recognition is concerned, the recognition and respect manifested by
the Royal Proclamation were motivated by pragmatic considerations intended to
serve the best interests of the Crown, without offending the Indians.
By signing the
treaties, at least on paper, the Indians certainly acknowledged the supremacy
of the Crown and signified their submission to and obedience of the laws of the
new Sovereign, which laws were alien, just about in every respect and often
enough, hostile to their culture, beliefs, traditions, customs and practices.
On the other hand, the
ceremonies conducted by the Indians on the occasion of treaty making have been shown
to be proof of the fact that
Indians saw and interpreted the
treaties differently than the Crown officials.
Yet, in the context of the preponderance of the numbered treaties,
the Treaty Commissioners’ speeches fail to disclose any real understanding of
and recognition of the aboriginal perspective on treaty making in the light of the
Indians’ cultures, customs, practices,
and as GRIP puts it, of their “ governance,
jurisdiction, legal traditions” associated with the surrender of their lands. Nevertheless,
the aboriginal perspective ended up being subject to the following caveat found
in numbered treaties, as for example in Treaty No.6:
“….subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by Her
Government of Her Dominion of Canada, and saving
and excepting such tracts as may from time to time be required or taken up for
settlement, mining, lumbering or other purposes by Her said Government of the
Dominion of Canada, or by any of the subjects thereof duly authorized therefor
by the said Government. (Italics mine)
In the context of the
numbered treaties, the only thing Treaty Commissioners certainly recognised were
the facts that the aboriginal inhabitants were in possession of the lands whose
surrender they sought to obtain and that for the reasons set out in the Royal
Proclamation, it was in the best interest of the Crown to purchase these lands
rather than just seize them.
As a matter of law,
after the enactment of the Indian Act of 1876 and the establishment and
management of Indians bands in accordance with its provisions, the cultures
beliefs, customs and practices of Indians relating to land became moot.
Hence, to the extent
recognition existed, certainly with the numbered treaties, it was lopsided with
the Crown’s recognition in effect being
limited to the recognition of the pre-existing
rights stipulated in the treaties and nothing being said
about, let alone acknowledged, of the Indians’ subsisting rights under
the English common law.
5. Were the treaties based on mutual respect?
In so far as the notion
of mutual respect is concerned, while the Indians showed respect to the
newcomers, the Treaty Commissioners showed
theirs in their speeches and b, when and where called upon to do so, participating
in the treaty -making ceremonies
conducted by the Indians.
As to the respect of
the Indians with whom the government negotiated and made treaties is concerned,
the taking of the surrendered lands on which the Indians were given certain
rights, without any compensatory gesture for the revocation of these rights on
those lands does not strike me as being
particularly respectful.
As a matter of fact, I
cannot think of anything in the provisions of the treaties in question or in
their implementation that showed much, if any, respect.
The fact of the matter
is that treaties, certainly the numbered treaties were drafted prior to the
treaty-making meetings, and, as such, are a legal instrument akin to contracts
of adhesions of which one of the standard clauses in the preponderance of the
numbered treaties, imposed upon the Indians
“… [the duty to] aid and assist the officers of Her
Majesty in bringing to justice and punishment any Indian offending against the
stipulations of this treaty.”(Treaty no.6)
Certainly, on matters
of aboriginal decision-making, governance, jurisdiction, legal traditions concerning
the lands and the aboriginal communities, to paraphrase Major and Binnie JJ. in
Mitchell, the treaties read in
conjunction with the Indian Act, did not provide, “much space for Indians to be
Indians”. (para.134)
And I venture say that
the following rights granted under the treaties were motivated by pragmatism
rather than respect:
a) to pursue traditional avocations of hunting
and fishing and farming, if they so wish;
b) to select the location of the lands on which
they wished to establish their reserves;
c) to receive
compensation for the reserve lands which may be appropriated up by the Crown for “...public works or buildings, of what
nature soever”, and
d) to be paid annuities, with the Chiefs receiving a stipend in addition to
the standard annuity.
The numbered treaties
may also be looked upon as precursors to the modern welfare state and to
this extent as some expression of respect, albeit inevitably intertwined with
self-interest and pragmatic considerations. For example, Treaty no.6 undertakes to provide Indians
a) monetary incentives
and support;
b) the tools and
materials to help them pursue their avocations;
c) education or more precisely the promise
“ to maintain schools for instruction in such reserves hereby made as to
Her Government of the Dominion of Canada may seem advisable, whenever the Indians of the reserve shall desire it.” (Italics
mine), and
d) disaster relief:
“in the event … the Indians comprised within this treaty being overtaken
by any pestilence, or by a general famine, the Queen, on being satisfied
…….will grant to the Indians assistance of such character and to such extent as
Her Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs shall deem necessary and sufficient
to relieve the Indians from the calamity that shall have befallen them.”
And sad but true to say, apart from the annuities and stipends, the
government did not always deliver on its promises and undertakings and when it
did deliver, often enough, it did so, in
part, late or both.
All of which fails to show much, if any, respect.
In the premises, Principle 5 fails to describe accurately the record of
historical treaty- making, if nothing else certainly with respect to the
preponderance of numbered treaties.
I do wish the government would stop engaging in historical revisionism
with fine phrases. These are of no benefit to the aboriginal peoples except
when these turn out to be prejudicial to the position or arguments of the
government.
Surely, the government having made the point that knowing our “true
history” and “truth telling” are an integral component of the first phase of
reconciliation process; it ought to abide by its own pronouncements.
6. The rest of the narrative
under the heading of Principle 5
The narrative goes on to state:
“The Government also acknowledges that the existence of Indigenous
rights is not dependent on an agreement.”
The Government’s acknowledgment is immaterial. Surely, that is what aboriginal
rights are all about and so were the rights of Indians before they entered into
land-cessation treaties and so are their rights at common law.
It then expresses what the agreements should and should not be about:
“…and, where agreements are formed, they should be based on the
recognition and implementation of rights and not their extinguishment,
modification, or surrender.”
It would take some imaginative powers to reconcile this proposition with the notion of
“lawful infringement” of treaty and aboriginal rights
Surely, as was the case with land-cession treaties, making an agreement
based on the recognition and implementation of certain rights does not preclude
the extinguishment, modification or surrender of other rights.
Furthermore, surely, the aboriginal peoples, properly informed and advised
by their Elders, lawyers and others of their choice, are or should be free to
consent to the extinguishment,
modification or abridgment of parts of one or more of their land-related rights,
in order to secure those things they need, to enable them for themselves and
for their future generations, as the narrative puts it, to exercise
“[their right to] determine and develop their own priorities and
strategies for organization and advancement… to freely pursue their economic,
political, social and cultural development.”
To say otherwise, would betray, G-d forbid, a”colonial” mind-set, inconsistent
with the aims of reconciliation.
Worse, it would amount to a breach of the aboriginal peoples’ right to
self-determination in PGRIP.
Interestingly enough, UNDRIP does not go as far as the government.
Article 32.1 reads:
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities
and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and
other
resources.
Principle 6- What is “free, prior and informed
consent” (FPIC) about?
1.The Principle
Before the 2015 election, in an Aboriginal Peoples Television Network town hall meeting,
the future Prime Minister, told his aboriginal audience that in the absence of the ” free, prior, informed consent”(FPIC) of
an aboriginal community to a pipeline project that would adversely affect it,
would “absolutely” result in the cancellation of the project.
In so doing, the Prime Minister,
yet again appeared to be thumping his nose to the judgments of the Supreme
Court of Canada that have held that the aboriginal peoples do not have the
right “to veto” a project that infringes their existing treaty and aboriginal
rights, provided the Crown and the proponents of the project comply fully with
their respective duties and obligations towards the affected aboriginal peoples
/communities set out by the Supreme Court and in the applicable legislation.
For an analysis of the FPIC requirement see: Ken S. Coates and Blaine Favel, Understanding FPIC, MacDonald-Laurier Institute, April 2016, macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/MLINumber9-FPICCoates-Favel04-29-WebReady.pdf
Articles 32.2 and
32.3 of UNDRIP read:
2. States shall consult and cooperate
in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order
to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting
their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other
resources. (Italics mine) 3.
States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any
such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse
environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
The corresponding Principle 6
in PGRIP reads:
The Government of Canada recognizes that meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples aims to secure their
free, prior and informed consent when
Canada proposes to take actions which impact them and their rights on their
lands, territories, and resources. (Italics mine)
Dwight Newman, Chair of Research
in Indigenous Rights at the University of Saskatchewan, College of Law, in an
opinion piece titled Ottawa’s sly turn on consent may hurt Indigenous
relations published in the Globe and Mail of August 3, 2017, noted the difference between the wording of
Article 32.1 and Principle 6.
He wrote:
“To the average reader, these
words may look very similar. But they matter immensely to lawyers, bureaucrats
and Indigenous communities. The language used in UNDRIP has occasioned a debate
on whether it imposes a requirement of obtaining consent or simply mandates
seeking consent in good faith but permitting various developments to proceed if
it is not obtained. [The] choice of language [in Principle 6] has the effect of
resolving this debate in favour of the lesser expectation-consultation, with no
requirement of obtaining consent. The UNDRIP language actually supports this
lesser expectation which to me, offers a reconciliation between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous interests that seek to be fair to all. (Fairly enough, my view
has been challenged, given the ongoing debate on the issue of consent).”
I agree with the Professor
Newman’s reasoning and interpretation of the requirement. This interpretation
is also supported by Article 32.3 which imposes on the States the mandatory obligation to
provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress and to take appropriate measures to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social,
cultural or spiritual impact for any such
activity , which I construe to include the activities with respect to which
FPIC had not been obtained.
At all events, the foregoing interpretation is consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the
lawful infringement of aboriginal or treaty rights.
2. Aboriginal
peoples’ role in public decision-making
The narrative of Principle 6 promises that
“[The government through various processes and
approaches] aimed at
securing consent, as well as creative and innovative
mechanisms that will
help build deeper
collaboration, consensus and new ways of working
together. It
will ensure that Indigenous peoples and their governments have
a role in decisions-making as part of the Canada’s constitutional framework and ensure that Indigenous rights, interests and aspirations are recognized in decision
making.” (Italics mine)
Tall order. The cows did not
take long to come home on the government’s promises. Never mind “deep
collaboration”, the representatives the AFN who, along with representatives of
the other two aboriginal nations, are to work on the development of
environmental legislation with the federal government and industry
representatives, halted their co-operation with the government less than a week after making headlines in the conference
convened by the government with respect to this project.
In their letter addressed to
the Prime Minister they accused the government
of breaching has breaching its
promises to work with aboriginal peoples as full partners in crafting
the rules under which major mining, oil, gas and pipeline projects would
be assessed, in this instance, by being left out of key decisions on the
proposed legislation. And in the process they exposed the inner rifts within
the AFN both political and on environmental issues, when the National Chief of
AFN refused to sign the letter
As quoted in the Globe and
Mail of October 19 inst., the letter dated October 16 in part reads:
“Technical discussions between
officials have been largely one-sided and do not encompass the principles of
collaboration and transparency that a nation-to nation relationship must embody.”
Such are the fruits of the
kinds of skating glib statements made to promote the sunny ways of the Prime
Minister.
Post-Script
1. Curious spellings and glib terminology
I think Canada must be the
only country where the government ignores the vocabulary and the spelling used
in its own Constitution. Thus,
1. The term “aboriginal” in
sub-section 35(1), for an unfathomable reason, is now spelled “Aboriginal”.
2. The Indians and the Métis in sub-section 35(2) are now referred to as the
First Nations and the Métis Nation, although neither of them are nations in
the proper sense of the word, particularly when the phrase First Nation is used
to refer to Indian bands. They are peoples.
In this regard, I am at loss
to understand the rationale for describing two of the aboriginal peoples as “nations”
while keep referring to the third people by its name: Inuit.
2.1. The word “nation”, also
for some unfathomable reason, is spelled with a capital N while we spell the
word correctly when we refer to the Canadian nation.
3. For yet another
unfathomable reason, the phrase “aboriginal peoples” in has been abandoned in
favour of “Indigenous people(s)” while UNDRIP which is to guide the reconciliation process, correctly spells
word as “indigenous” in compliance with
current rules of spelling.
I wonder whether this is done
to distinguish the aboriginal “Indigenous” peoples from non-aboriginal
“indigenous” Canadians?
I do wish however that, before
the vocabulary and the spelling get even more garbled, the government get rid of
them; use the constitutional vocabulary and spelling, and gets on with the
serious business of reconciliation.
2. Let’s quit mythologising aboriginal peoples
In a recent article in the
Globe and Mail of October 17, 2017 titled Indigenous
voices rise to the fore amid national energy debate, Shawn McCarthy.
The story is about a two day
summit of industry leaders convened by the federal Natural Resources Minister
to map out a national energy strategy where Indian, Metis and Inuit leaders are
reported to have taken “centre stage” with provincial ministers and company
executives.
Mr. McCarthy reported that in
an interview related to the this matter,Mr. Carr said:
”a national strategy needs to
be inspired by aboriginal peoples’ connection with the land and their sense of
responsibility to future generations.
We embrace the relationship
[with Indigenous people] that inevitably characterizes progress as a nation
with protection of the land, the air and the water.
And there truly is a
generational responsibility to build on what has come before and to leave the
place better than we found it. And those
values are inherent in aboriginal culture and aboriginal thinking” (Italics
mine).
Surely this is the kind of
political balderdash can only be uttered by a Minister who does not seem to be
clued into values that are inherent in aboriginal culture and thinking, from
historical and contemporary
perspectives.
The environmental experiences
of aboriginal peoples from pre-contact, up until the onset of industrialisation
and their relation to the land and its resources, is hardly be comparable to the
political and environmental problems we are presently experiencing.
The vast land mass and the
extremely low density of the peoples who roamed on these lands could or would
have hardly caused the crystallisation of the values that are alleged to be
inherent to aboriginal culture and thinking, with respect to a matter that was
not an existential issue or problem in the normal course of events, save when
the aboriginal peoples exterminated herds in times of famine.
Further, as the article points
out while some aboriginal leaders ” question the government’s commitment
to reconciliation while it is approving
pipelines over the objections of communities… many [other] leaders are
eager to partner with companies on oil
and gas projects, if they are treated with respect, see local benefits to their communities and the
environmental impacts are mitigated.”
At the end of the day, as the
National Chief of the AFN put it:
“It’s up to each First Nation to determine how it will
respond to development.”
Surely, if the attitude of the
leaders of the aboriginal peoples are divided on this environmental issue, and,
in final analysis, each band will make its own call as to whether it will
welcome development, and there are over 600 of them, the alleged aboriginal
values cannot possibly be inherent in their cultures and thinking in the sense
suggested by Minister Carr.
Consulting and studying the
views and submissions of the aboriginal peoples on environmental issues is a
commendable initiative that ought to be institutionalised, since they, like
other Canadians, have a genuine stake in the way the government’s energy plans
and policies are framed and affect both the environment and the economic
opportunities of Canadians, including the aboriginal peoples.
Furthermore, not all the
aboriginal persons or groups, subscribe to “environmentalism”, nor can they
expected to do so.
For example, when I handled
the defence against the lawsuit initiated by the Labrador Indians who sought
to stop, on environmental and other grounds, the training and exercise program of low- level flying out of Goose Bay, Labrador by the air forces
of some NATO member countries, I
had the occasion to see pictures or an amateur film, I cannot quite recall which it was, of
the summer camping grounds and environs used
by these Indians. It was an appallingly environmental sight.
Surely we can do away with mythologising
the aboriginal peoples’ environmental values and portraying these values as
being inherent to their culture and thinking. It is both untrue and
unnecessary.
We certainly can and must do
without complicating the reconciliation process by burdening it with
propositions that are both untrue and unnecessary
Concluding Note
I consider PGRIP to be
a public relations exercise of some sort.
To the extent the
document was or is intended to be a statement of the law pertinent to the subject of
reconciliation, it leaves much to be desired.
As as a retired member
of the Department of Justice who practiced in the field of aboriginal law over
a period of 24 years, I have no hesitation to state that this document, as
drafted, would not have seen the light of day on the watch of the Attorneys-General
under whom I served for 29 years and those that preceded them. And this not
because they would have objected or resisted to the reconciliation project.
Surely, Canadians
deserve better.
Hence, to answer the
question I framed at the beginning of the paper, I am inclined to conclude that,
in the light of the manner in which the project has proceeded up to this point
in time,
first, the reconciliation
process may well turn out to be the case of the elephant that gave birth to a
mouse.
second, the process may
yet turn into another emotionally draining bitter experience for the aboriginal
peoples because, regretfully the Prime Minister does not have the
wherewithal and the political courage to address in a timely fashion the
complex legal issues and the tough fact- driven ones, not to mention the
process management issues and find workable solutions that are satisfactory to
the aboriginal peoples and for that matter, to Canadians who support the process,
and
finally, Canadians will
not have to wait a long time to discover which way this new masterstroke is
heading.
For that matter, it
will not take long for the aboriginal leaders, particularly those of the Indian
peoples, who have been listening to the Prime Minister’s pronouncements and
comparing his words to his deeds, to question and then to despair the failure
of the process to produce significant progress towards the attainment of the
goals that matter to the aboriginal peoples.
Eliminating more than two dozen of boil -water
advisories and planning to end the remaining ones over a period of two years
plus, goes only so far to impress people, but no further.
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